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Part I
Introduction
3
Since I started college I have heard about the dissertation and four years have
passed and I have this project right in front of me.
The truth is that it has been difficult to choose a topic interesting as well as
related with economic theory because of our inexperience in this field. However,
after looking for an appropriate subject, I found that auction was a good candidate
since it mixes economics and mathematics at a quite high level.
The chosen option seemed the most appropriated for developing a project
where I could apply what I have learned over the past four years. Moreover, another
reason I chose this area was because of my interest in probability and applied
mathematics and how to apply my knowledge to the real world.
But, how the auctions work?
Usually, objects in the markets have a defined price where buyers accept it
purchasing the object. However, in some cases, objects are sold in themarkets using
a competitive game among the potential, few of them generally, buyers pretending
that the buyer who likes it more will acquire it. Notice that, if the mechanism is
appropriated, the one who likes it more is the one who is willing to pay more for it.
This game is called an auction where the buyers are called bidders and what they
offer for the object is a bid. The auction (that is, the proposed game) should satisfy
certain properties like, for instance, who is willing to pay more for the object needs
to be the one getting it. In other words, an auction is not a lottery since in this case
the one getting the prize is not necessarily the one who has bought more tickets.
In general, in game theory, a game is defined by the number of players, their
strategies and the payoff functions of the players (that are the payments of each
player for any given strategy profile) (see, [9] An Introduction to Game Theory,
Osborne, M.J.). Here, we could differentiate between complete and incomplete
information games if we have all the information to knowwhat strategy follows each
player is a complete information game and otherwise an incomplete information
game. Returning to the auctions, the payoff functions are unknown to the bidders
except his own payoff function because if some buyer knows what would be the
payoff function of another competitor he would change his bid to win. Thus, an
auction is an incomplete information game.
Let us propose an easy example to differentiate between complete and incom-
plete information games. Suppose that a seller wants to auction a painting and there
are two interested buyers Anne and Bart. Suppose that Anne’s value for the painting
is vA = 10000$ and Bart’s value is vB = 8000$. The auction mechanism establishes
that each buyer must bid in a sealed envelope then, the seller assigns the painting
to the highest bid and the winner pays what he has bid. If the Anne’s offer is equal
to Bart’s, the painting is assigned to Anne or Bart with probability 1/2.
As we can see, the values of the players are what they think the object costs. The
strategy set is any non negative offer. Suppose that the buyers are risk neutral, which
means that if the bidder is between choices he could choose what he thinks even if
one is riskier. To begin with, Anne’s payoff function is determined by her value, her
offer, bA , and Bart’s offer, bB . To define exactly what is her payoff function, wemust
differentiate what offer is higher than the other. Firstly, if Anne wins the painting,
her offer is higher than Bart’s, then her payoff function will be vA −bA . In case she
does not win, her payoff function would be 0. Finally, if the offers are equal then, we
must do a raffle between Anne and Bart to know who would win the object. Thus,
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her payoff function would be 12 (vA −bA ). Thus,
ΠA (bA ,bB ) =
⎧⎨⎩
vA −bA if bA > bB
1
2 (vA −bA ) if bA = bB
0 if bA < bB
Bart’s payoff function will be Anne’s payoff function but changing her value and
offer by Bart’s value and offer.
ΠB (bA ,bB ) =
⎧⎨⎩
vB −bB if bB > bA
1
2 (vB −bB ) if bB = bA
0 if bB < bA
As a conclusion, when the players know certainly all the game’s elements,
particularly, the payoff functions, we say this is a complete information game.
Secondly, the dissertation differentiates between private (Part II) and interde-
pendent (Part III) value auctions. Private-value auctions correspond to the case
where the actual value of the object for a bidder i only depends on its signal and
not on the signals (valuations) of all the other bidders. A good example of a private
value auction would be the acquisition of an object in www.ebay.com. On the other
hand, interdependent-value auctions correspond to the case where the actual value
of the object for a bidder i depends not only on his own value but on the signals of
all bidders. As example of interdependent values, we could think about the radio-
frequency auction. Let us suppose that a Company A had the frequency 100.00 for
almost 30 years and now a Company B wants this frequency for himself. Company
A’s value could or could not depend on Company B’s value, but not viceversa be-
cause the Company B knows the relation between Company A and his frequency.
Here, we have that the Company B’s value depends on information of the other bid-
der.
When we talk about auctions, people, usually, think about selling art or fish,
but nowadays, a seller could auction almost everything. Let us focus on selling art
and fish auctions. Firstly, when a painting is auctioned, the seller starts with an
entrance price so that people who can not afford the painting do not enter to the
auction. Then, the price of the painting starts rising until only one buyer remains.
This one wins the object and pays the seller an amount equal to the price at which
the second-last bidder dropped out. This kind of auction is called English Auction
and is the oldest and prevalent auction form. Secondly, in the sale of fish, the
product starts with a price high enough so that presumably no bidder is interested
in buying the object at that price. Then, the price is gradually going under until
some bidder indicates his interest. This one is called the Open Descending Price
or Dutch Auction. Although, these two auctions are the most common, we could
imagine othermechanisms like Third Price Auctions etc. In fact, it is well known that
an English Auction is strategically equivalent to a sealed-bid Second Price Auction
while under reasonable assumptions, the OpenDescending Auction is equivalent to
a sealed-bid First Price Auction.
In Chapter 5 we will prove that for a huge class of auctions the expected revenue
of the auction (that is what the seller expects to win before the game starts) is
the same. This result is known as Expected revenue equivalence Theorem (see
[8] Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Vickrey, W.).
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The key assumptions for this theorem are symmetry among players (and so bids),
risk neutral players, values are independently and identically distributed and the
expected payment of a bidder with value zero is zero.
As de reader can imagine, this dissertation is a theoretical rather than practical
approach on auction theory, it does not improve or revolutionize it. The objective is
to understand and venture into the world of auction theory following Vijay Krishna’s
Auction Theory [6].
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Auctions
Collins Definition of Auction
A public sale of goods or property, especially one in which prospective pur-
chasers bid against each other until the highest price is reached. [1]
1.1 History of Auctions
The origin of auctions
The firsts references about auctions are dated around the 500 B.C. in Babylon, where
womenwere auctioned off aswives. They used a descendingmethod of sale and also
they accepted returns if the winner were not satisfied with what he just won. Even
thought, nowadays, this practice is considered awful, in ancient Babylon selling a
daughter outside of the auction method was considered illegal.
In ancient Rome we find some auction cases too. One of the most important
auction events occurred in 193 A.D., when the Praetorian Guard killed the Emperor
Pertinax, in an action of revenge, and they auctioned the Empire to the highest
bidder. The winner, Didius Julianus, was declared emperor, but due to the anger
of the people, in just one month erupted a civil war and two months after, Didius
Julianus was assassinated when Septimus Severus conquered Rome. [2]
18th century
Late 18th century in France, both before and after the French Revolution, the
auctions were held daily in bars to sell art. These auctions were accompanied by
printed catalogs announcing what they were going to auction. As a curiosity, the
most important auction houses were founded in the 18th century, Christie’s in 1766
and Sotheby’s in 1744.
Recent history, 20th century
Many auction schools were opened in America and they taught general merchan-
dise, real estate and fine stock auctioneering. Even thought, many auctioneers be-
lieved that an auctioneer could not be trained; auctioneering was a gift.
In the 50s, the sale of goods and real estate by auctions was growing exponen-
tially. There was a need for real estate and personal property to be sold faster than
the private market would allow. It was the birth of the modern auction business.
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The 1990s and nowadays
The technology has an important role in modern auctions. Anybody can bid for any
product only by phone call, making this process faster and bearable. But technology
is not important only for the bidders, also it can be used by auctioneers to take
pictures of small auction items and send them to the bidders and thereby they can
take a closer look to the object which they are going to bid for.
In the last years, an important application of auction theory to a relevant eco-
nomic problem has taken place when governments have auctioned to telecommu-
nication companies the right to use the different bands in the radio-electric space.
Their need to obtain a high price as possible has largely contributed to the develop-
ment of the theory.
Even though we have not defined the auction types yet, it is important to know
how the most important auction websites work. To begin with, the most important
and famous auctioning website is www.ebay.comwhich consists on sell any kind of
objects by a First Ascending Price but sometimes the buyer has an option to acquire
de object buying it for a price given. In these auctions, the seller could have a reserve
price that allows him to set a low starting price to generate interest and bidding, but
protects him from having to sell his item at a price that he feels is too low. Also the
seller can remove his reserve price when the first bid is received. [3]
1.2 Definitions and Basic Properties
Auctions are a particular case of games, since buyers compete, by means of their
bids, to obtain the object on sale and the success of a buyer’s bid depends on the
bids of the other buyers.
A game is a situation where several agents must take individual decisions
or strategies to obtain an outcome. What characterizes a game is the strategic
interdependence, that is the outcome for each agent depends not only on his own
strategy but also on the strategies chosen by the other agents.
1.2.1 Game Theory
We include a brief introduction to game theory to showwhere the auctions could be
classified as games.
Definition 1.1. A game is a triple
$
N,{Si }i∈N ,{Πi }i∈N
%
where:
• N= {1,2, . . . ,N } is the players set.
• Si for i = 1,2, . . . ,N is the strategy set of each player.
• Πi (s1,s2, . . . ,sN ) ∈ ! for i ∈ 1,2, . . . ,N are the payoff functions. Πi represents
the payoff that the player i obtains if the strategy combination (s1,s2, . . . ,sN ) ∈
S1×S2× · · ·×SN occurs.
A strategy profile is a combination (s1,s2, . . . ,sN ) ∈ S1 ×S2 × · · ·×SN formed by one
strategy for each player.
Notice that, in general, the strategy set is not easy to determine.
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1.2.1.1 Complete InformationGames
We have a game with complete information when every player knows exactly the
payoff function of each player. Then, if a player thinks of an strategy profile he
could evaluate the payoff function of each player and know what it would be the
consequences of using this strategy.
Solving a game consists on finding an equilibrium, which is a strategy profile
where each player observes that given the strategies of the other players, his strategy
is the best he could choose. For that reason, in equilibrium, no player wants to
change his strategy, because if he changes he would be worse off.
Now, we definemathematically an equilibrium.
Definition 1.2. The strategy profile
&
s ∗1,s
∗
2, . . . ,s
∗
N
'
∈S1×S2× · · ·×SN is a Nash equi-
librium of a game with complete information
$
N= {1,2, . . . ,N } ,{Si }i∈N ,{Πi }i∈N
%
,
Πi
&
s ∗1,s
∗
2, . . .s
∗
i−1,s
∗
i ,s
∗
i+1, . . . ,s
∗
N
'
≥ Πi
&
s ∗1,s
∗
2, . . .s
∗
i−1,si ,s
∗
i+1, . . . ,s
∗
N
'
, ∀si ∈Si
1.2.1.2 Incomplete Information Games
On the other hand, in most cases, we do not know the payoff functions, then we
have a game of incomplete information.
Definition 1.3. To define what an incomplete information game is let us describe
the following elements:
• The players setN.
• The strategy set of each player, Si for i ∈ N. We denote a player’s i action as
si ∈Si .
• The possible types set Ti for each player i . We denote as ti ∈ Ti the type of the
player i . Given a types vector, one for each player, (t1, . . . , ti−1, ti , ti+1, . . . , tN )
wewrite t−i to represent the vector of types of players different from i .
• The conjecture that thinks each player i about the other players type that
maybe could be conditioned by his type, pi (t−i | ti ).
• The payoff functions Πi (s1,s2, . . . ,sN ; t1, . . . , tN )∈! for i = 1,2, . . . ,N .
A strategy si for player i is a function of his type, si = si (ti ), which means that this
strategy could recommend player i a different action in each of his types.
Notice that here, the strategies of the other players also depend on their types
which the player i does not know with certainty. Then, what we want to do is to
maximize expected payoff.
This Nash equilibrium in incomplete information games is known as Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1.4. In a incomplete information game
G =
$
N ;S1, . . . ,SN ;T1, . . . ,TN ;p1, . . . ,pN ;Π1, . . . ,ΠN
%
the strategies s ∗ =
&
s ∗1, . . . ,s
∗
N
'
are a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for each i =
1,2, . . . ,N and each type, ti ∈ Ti , the strategy s ∗i (ti ) is a solution of
max
si∈Si
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi (t−i | ti )Πi
&
s ∗1 (t1) , . . . ,s
∗
i−1 (ti−1) ,si ,s
∗
i+1 (ti+1) , . . . ,s
∗
N (tN ) ; t1, . . . , tN
'
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Notice that an auction is a gamewhere the buyers are the players and the bids are
the actions. The payoff functions are the profits that each buyer obtains. Moreover,
an auction is an incomplete information game because we do not know how the
other buyers valuate the object on sale and hence we do not know his profit with
certainty. Then, the players’ types are the possible valuations of the objects. We
assume the possible types are the same for every player. The conjectures of each
player are a distribution function of each player over the set of types of the others.
1.2.2 Classification of the Auctions
In this subsection we review the most common auction forms. They can be
classified either because of their format, simultaneous sealed bid auctions or open
auctions, or because of the information buyers have of the valuations of their
competitors.
1.2.2.1 According to the Format
Sealed-bid auctions
The players submit bids in sealed envelopes, this means that it is a simultaneous
auction. We can divide the sealed-bid auctions in two parts:
1. First Price Sealed-bid auctions. The winner is the highest bid and pays what
he bid.
2. Second Price Sealed-bid Auctions. The winner is the highest bid too, but pays
the second highest bid.
Open format auctions
The open format auctions are themost common auction that we see in harbors or
in fine art auctions. A player bids and the other know what he bid, then he can bid
again if the auction goes on. This is a sequential auction that we can divide in two
types:
1. Open ascending price or English auction. It starts with a low price defined
by the auctioneer and raises it as long as there are at least two bidders. The
auction ends when only one of theses two bidders remains in the auction.
Then, he pays what the last player that abandons the game has bid.
2. Open descending price or Dutch auction. It starts with a very high price which
no bidder is interested in, and, over time, the price is descending until some
bidder shows some interest. Then, the object is sold to this bidder and pays
what he bid.
Notice that there is an equivalence between the First Price Sealed-bid Auctions and
the Dutch auctions because what the winner pays is the same in the two auctions,
what he has bid. Also, we have this equivalence between the Second Price Sealed-
bid Auctions and the English Auction due to the same reason: the winner pays the
second highest bid.
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1.2.2.2 According to the Valuations
Private values
The valuation for buyer i of the object or objects only depends on a signal that
buyer i receives:
Vi (x1, . . . ,xN ) = Vi (xi )
where Vi denotes the value that the bidder i assigns to the object. In fact, notice
that with private values we use Vi (xi ) = xi and it does not depend on the signals (or
valuations) of the other buyers.
Interdependent values
The valuation of the object or objects depends on the signals received by all
buyers:
Vi (x1, . . . ,xN )
Then, Vi depends on the N variables which could be independent of each other.
If Vi (x1, . . . ,xN ) = V (x1, . . . ,xN ) for all i , then, it is defined like a common value
auction.
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Part II
Private-value Auctions
12
Chapter 2
Second Price Auctions
Let us suppose we have a symmetric model whichmeans that we have:
Players. We suppose we have N players.
Valuations. The value that the player i assigns to the object is Xi . Each Xi
is a random variable independently and identically distributed on some interval
[0,ω], ω ∈ !+. Also, we can assume ω = ∞, abusing of notation. Let us suppose
that Xi follows a distribution F (xi ) and density f (xi ).
Offer. It is the function which assigns to any possible valuation the offer or bid
of each buyer i :
βi : [0,ω] −→ !+
xi )→ βi (xi )
Notice this is a game of incomplete information where the players are the buyers,
the valuations are the types of the agents and the offers their available strategies.
Recall that a strategy of a player i is a simultaneous game of incomplete information
consists in specifying one action for each of his types. In the auction game, the
strategy of a buyer specifies a bid for each of his possible valuations.
The objective is to find the strategies that form an equilibrium in the two auction
formats.
We denote by β ∗ the strategies in equilibrium, understanding that ∗ = I for a
First Price Auction and ∗= I I for a Second Price Auction.
2.1 Equilibrium bids
We begin with the study of the Second Price Auctions due to its easiness compared
to the First Price Auctions.
In a Second Price Auction the payoff function of a bidder i is:
Πi (b1, . . . ,bN ) =
)
xi −maxj ̸=i b j if bi >maxj ̸=i b j
0 if bi <maxj ̸=i b j
where bi is what the bidder i bids. In case we have a tie, bi =maxj ̸=i b j , then the
object auctioned is going to be raffled between the people who bid bi .
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Proposition 2.1. In a Second Price Sealed-bid Auction, it is a weakly dominant
strategy to bid according to β I I (x ) = x .
Proof. Suppose we are the player i , then our expected payoff when bidding bi is
obtained by the next formula:
Πi =
*
xi −max
j ̸=i
b j
+
Pr
*
bi >max
j ̸=i
b j
+
We want to maximize our expected payoff, given the bids of the remaining
bidders.
To see that β I I (xi ) = xi is an equilibrium, we want to see that if β I I (xi ) ̸̸= xi we
are going to be worse than with β I I (xi ) = xi . Let’s suppose that β I I (xi ) = xi ± c with
c ∈!+ and we define bk as bk :=maxj ̸=i b j .
Bid Win Lose Win/Lose
xi xi −bk 0 0
xi + c xi −bk 0 xi −bk
Notice that when xi < bk we prefer not to win because we are going to pay more
than our valuation.
Bid Win Lose Win/Lose
xi xi −bk 0 xi −bk
xi − c xi −bk 0 0
So, each buyer i bids his valuation xi and the buyer with the highest valuation
wins.
The following example shows that the equilibrium we have presented in the
Second Price Auction is not unique.
Example 2.1. The next table illustrates an example with the valuation of the object
for each player and what they really bid.
i 1 2 3
xi 0,1 0,4 0,9
bi 1 0 0
We have that the bidder 1 wins the auction although he is not paying anything
for the object and, actually, he is the one who values less the object. Notice that this
is an equilibrium since given what bidder 1 does, the others do not have incentives
to deviate.
On the other hand, going back to the equilibrium, presented in Proposition 2.1
each agent bids his own valuation. Let us remark that the expected revenue for the
seller increases and goes to 1 as the numbers of bidders grows larger.
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2.2 Order statistics
Now we are introducing the order statistics, an important tool for this section
because all calculations we do are going to be very useful for auctions.
Let X1, . . . ,XN be independent and identically distributed random variables
with distribution function F and density function f . We define Y1:N , . . . ,YN :N as a
rearrangement of X1, . . . ,XN . For all 1 ≤ k ≤ N , Y k :N is the random variable that
follows the bigger kth realization over N realizations. This Y k :N are called order
statistics.
Highest Order Statistic
Now, we calculate the distribution function of the highest order statistic, Y1:N .
F1:N
$
y
%
= Pr
$
Y1:N ≤ y
%
= Pr
$
max{X1, . . . ,XN }≤ y
%
=
N∏
i=1
Pr
$
Xi ≤ y
%
=
N∏
i=1
F (y ) = F (y )N
In the second equality we use that X1, . . . ,XN are independent and identically
distributed.
Then, the density function of Y1:N is the derivative of its distribution function.
f 1:N (y ) =
∂ F1:N
∂ y
(y ) =NF (y )N−1 f (y ) (2.1)
SecondHighest Order Statistic
Now, we calculate the distribution function of the second highest order statistics,
Y2:N .
F2:N
$
y
%
= Pr
$
Y2:N ≤ y
%
= Pr
$
max {X1, . . . ,XN }≤ y
%
+
N∑
i=1
Pr
$
Xi > y
% N∏
j=1
j ̸=i
Pr
&
Xj ≤ y
'
= F (y )N +
N∑
i=1
$
1− F (y )
%
F (y )N−1
= (1−N )F (y )N +NF (y )N−1
In the second equality we use that Pr
$
Y2:N ≤ y
%
is equal to the probability of all
X1, . . . ,XN are being smaller than y plus the probability of Xi being bigger than y ,
times the probability of the other X1, . . .Xi−1,Xi−1, . . . ,XN being smaller than y . Also
we use that X1, . . . ,XN are independent and identically distributed.
Then, the density function of Y2,N is the derivative of its distribution function.
f 2:N (y ) =
∂ F2:N
∂ y
(y ) = N (1−N )F (y )N−1 f (y )+N (N −1)F (y )N−2 f (y )
= N (N −1)F (y )N−2 f (y )
$
1− F (y )
%
Remark. We see that
f 2:N (y ) = N f 1:N−1(y )
$
1− F (y )
%
(2.2)
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Joint and Conditional Distributions of Order Statistics
Even thoughX1, . . . ,XN are independently drawn, the order statistics Y1:N ,Y2:N , . . . ,YN :N
are not independent. Then, the joint density of Y = (Y1:N ,Y2:N , . . . ,YN :N ) is
f Y :N
$
y1,y2, . . . ,yN
%
=
)
N ! f
$
y1
%
f
$
y2
%
. . . f
$
yN
%
if y1 ≥ · · ·≥ yN
0 otherwise
Then, we can knowwhat it will be the density in general ofY ′ = (Y1:N ,Y2:N , . . . ,Yk :N )
f Y ′:N
$
y1,y2, . . . ,yk
%
=
)
N (N −1) . . . (N −k ) f
$
y1
%
f
$
y2
%
. . . f
$
yk
%
F
$
yk
%N−k if y1 ≥ · · ·≥ yk
0 otherwise
What interests us is the density of the first and second order statistics that will be
f Y1:N ,Y2:N
$
y1,y2
%
=
)
N (N −1) f
$
y1
%
f
$
y2
%
F
$
y2
%N−2 if y1 ≥ y2
0 otherwise
Now the density of Y2:N conditional on Y1:N = y is
f 2:N
$
z | Y1:N = y
%
=
⎧⎨⎩
f Y1:N ,Y2:N (y ,z )
f 1:N (y )
if y ≥ z
0 otherwise
=
⎧⎨⎩
N (N−1)f (y ) f (z )F (z )N−2
N f (y )F(y )
N−1 if y ≥ z
0 otherwise
=
⎧⎨⎩
(N−1) f (z )F (z )N−2
F (y )
N−1 if y ≥ z
0 otherwise
On the other hand, the density of Y1:N−1 conditional on Y1:N−1 < y is
f 1:N−1
$
z | Y1:N−1 < y
%
=
f 1:N−1 (z )
F1:N−1
$
y
%
=
(N −1) f (z )FN−2 (z )
FN−1
$
y
%
= f 2:N
$
z | Y1:N = y
%
(2.3)
Since notice that y ≥ z .
2.3 Revenue and Expected Payment in Second Price
Auctions
Let us find what is the expected payment of any player in a Second Price Auction,
mII (x ). This payment is the product of probability of winning and the amount he
pays when he wins.
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mII (x ) = Pr(Win)E
-
2nd highest bid | x is the highest bid
.
= Pr(Y1:N−1 < x )E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < x ]
= F (x )N−1
1
F (x )N−1
ˆ x
0
z f 1:N−1(z ) d z
=
ˆ x
0
z f 1:N−1(z ) d z
In the third equality we use the definition of the conditional expectation of a
random variable X given that X < x which is E [X |X < x ] = 1
F (x )
´ x
0 z f (z )d z .
Then, the ex ante (that is, before he knows his type) expected payment of any
player is:
E
/
mII (X )
0
=
ˆ ω
0
mII (x ) f (x ) dx
=
ˆ ω
0
*ˆ x
0
z f 1:N−1(z ) d z
+
f (x ) dx
The expected revenue is what the auctioneers expects to win for this auction and
it is sum of the ex ante expected payments of each player, then:
E
/
RI I
0
=
N∑
i=1
E
/
mII (X )
0
= NE
/
mII (X )
0
Proposition 2.2. The expected revenue is the expectation of the second highest
value, namely
E
/
RI I
0
=
ˆ ω
0
z f 2:N (z ) d z = E [Y2:N ] (2.4)
Proof. We know that:
E
/
mII (X )
0
=
ˆ ω
0
*ˆ x
0
z f 1:N−1(z ) d z
+
f (x ) dx
=
1
F (x )
ˆ x
0
z f 1:N−1(z ) d z
2ω
0
−
ˆ ω
0
xF (x ) f 1:N−1(x ) dx
=
ˆ ω
0
z f 1:N−1(z ) d z −
ˆ ω
0
xF (x ) f 1:N−1(x ) dx
=
ˆ ω
0
x f 1:N−1(x ) dx −
ˆ ω
0
xF (x ) f 1:N−1(x ) dx
=
ˆ ω
0
x f 1:N−1(x ) (1− F (x )) dx
=
ˆ ω
0
x f 2:N (x )
1
N
dx
=
1
N
ˆ ω
0
x f 2:N (x ) dx
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In the second equality we use the integration by parts, where
u =
´ x
0 z f 1:N−1(z ) d z and d v = f (x ) dx . In the sixth, we use (2.2).
Knowing that E
-
RI I
.
=NE
-
mII (X )
.
, then:
E
/
RI I
0
= NE
/
mII (X )
0
= N ·
1
N
ˆ ω
0
x f 2:N (x ) dx
=
ˆ ω
0
x f 2:N (x ) dx
Next example computes the ex ante expected revenue of a Second Price Auction
when valuations follow a uniform distribution.
Example 2.2. Suppose that the signals of the players follow a continuous uniform
distribution U (0,1), which means w = 1 and F (x ) = x and f (x ) = 1. We want
to calculate the expected payment and the expected revenue of this distribution.
Firstly, we begin with the expected payment:
mII (x ) =
ˆ x
0
z f 1:N−1(z ) d z =
ˆ x
0
z (N −1)zN−2 d z
=
1
(N −1)
zN
N
2x
0
= (N −1)
xN
N
Let’s calculate the ex ante expected payment:
E
/
mII (X )
0
=
ˆ 1
0
(N −1)
xN
N
dx =
1
N −1
N
xN+1
N +1
21
0
=
N −1
N (N +1)
Then, the expected revenue will be:
E
/
RI I
0
= NE
/
mII (X )
0
=
N −1
N +1
18
Chapter 3
First Price Auctions
3.1 Equilibrium bids
Aswe did in the Second Price Auctions we start defining which is its payoff function.
Here, each player bids bi and, if he wins, he pays his bid.
Πi
$
b1, . . . ,bN
%
=
)
xi −bi if bi >maxj ̸̸=i b j
0 if bi <maxj ̸̸=i b j
In case we had a draw between k bidders, bi = maxj ̸̸=i b j , we must do a raffle
between these k players with the same probability of winning.
Remark. If we use the strategy of the Second Price Auction, β I I (x ) = x , if we win we
are going to have 0 profit. Then, the equilibriumwill be different to the Second Price
Auction because we want to winmoney with the auction.
Lemma 3.1. If βi is a symmetric increasing and differentiable equilibrium strategy,
then:
1. βi (0) = 0
2. βi (ω) =βj (ω) = b¯ <ω ∀i , j
Proof. Firstly, weproof the first statement. Fixed x ∈ [0,ω] , it is better to doβi (x ) = x
than βi (x ) = y > x because if we do βi (x ) = y > x then if we win the auction we
lose money since x − y < 0. Then, βi (0) = 0. Also, we prefer to do βi (ω) = ω than
βi (ω)>ω due to the same reasoning than before.
To proof that βi (ω) = βj (ω) = b¯ < ω ∀i , j , suppose that player i follows the
strategy βi and it happens βi (ω)> βj (ω). This strategy is not optimal for i because
he wins, but with βi (ω) = βj (ω)+ ϵ, ϵ > 0 he also wins but he pays less. Then, in the
limit βi (ω) = βj (ω) and due to the symmetric and increasing strategies we have that
βi (ω) = βj (ω) = b¯ <ω .
Like in the Second Price Auctions, our achievement is to find the First Price Auction
symmetric and increasing equilibrium. We want to know which would be the
optimal bid β . Then, if the bidder i has value x and bids bi while the remaining
bidders bid according to β , his payoff function will be
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Πi = (x −bi )Pr
*
bi ≥max
j ̸=i
b j
+
= (x −bi )Pr
*
bi ≥max
j ̸=i
β
&
Xj
'+
= (x −bi )Pr
*
bi ≥ β
*
max
j ̸=i
X j
++
= (x −bi )Pr
$
bi ≥ β (Y1:N−1)
%
= (x −bi )Pr
&
β−1 (bi )≥ Y1:N−1
'
= (x −bi )F
&
β−1 (bi )
'N−1
Our purpose is to find a bi that optimizes the payoff function. Then, assuming
differentiability, we derive with respect to bi .
0 =
∂ Πi
∂ bi
0 = (N −1)F
&
β−1 (bi )
'N−2&
β−1
'′
(bi ) f
&
β−1 (bi )
'
(x −bi )− F
&
β−1 (bi )
'N−1
0 = (N −1)F
&
β−1 (bi )
'N−2 1
β
′ $
β−1 (bi )
% f &β−1 (bi )' (x −bi )− F &β−1 (bi )'N−1
In the third equality we use the Inverse Function Theorem. In a symmetric
equilibrium we have that β (x ) = bi , Then,
(N −1)F (x )N−2
1
β
′
(x )
f (x )
$
x −β (x )
%
− F (x )N−1 = 0
(N −1)F (x )N−2 f (x )
$
x −β (x )
%
= F (x )N−1β
′
(x )
β
′
(x )F (x )N−1+β (x ) (N −1)F (x )N−2 f (x ) = (N −1)F (x )N−2 f (x )x
d
dx
&
β (x )F (x )N−1
'
= (N −1)F (x )N−2 f (x )x
Now, using the Lemma 3.1, we have the initial condition β (0) = 0 to solve the
differential equation.
β (x )F (x )N−1 =
ˆ x
0
(N −1)F (z )N−2 f (z )z d z
β (x ) =
1
F (x )N−1
ˆ x
0
(N −1)F (z )N−2 f (z )z d z
β (x ) = E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < x ]
Hence, we have obtained that if there is a symmetric and increasing equilibrium
β (x ) it must be E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < x ]. Let us now prove that this is, indeed, an
equilibrium.
Now, we want to see that β (x ) = E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < x ] is an equilibrium strategy
in a First Price Auction.
Proposition 3.1. β I (x ) = E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < x ] is a symmetric equilibrium strategy
in a First Price Auction, where Y1:N−1 is the highest of N − 1 independently drawn
values.
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Proof. Suppose that N − 1 bidders follow the strategy β I . Let’s see that the missing
bidder i follows this strategy too. Firstly, β I is an increasing and continuous
function. Then, in equilibrium the player with the highest value bids the highest
price to win the auction. In the other hand, it is not optimal for the player i bid
b > β I (ω). Suppose bidder i with value x bids something different from β I (x ),
assume he bids b = β I (z ). Then, the payoff function will be
Π (x ,b ) = Π
&
x ,β I (z )
'
=
&
x −β I (z )
'
Pr (Y1:N−1 ≤ z )
= (x − E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < z ])F (z )
N−1
= xF (z )N−1− E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < z ]F (z )
N−1
= xF (z )N−1−
ˆ z
0
s (N −1)F (s )N−2 f (s ) d s
= xF (z )N−1−
/
s F (s )N−1
0z
0
+
ˆ z
0
F (s )N−1 d s
= (x − z )F (z )N−1+
ˆ z
0
F (s )N−1 d s (3.1)
In the fourth equality, we use E [X |X < z ] = 1
F (z )
´ x
0 s f (s ) d s and in the sixth
equality we use the integration by parts.
Then we obtain that the difference between the payoffs when bidding β I (x ) and
bidding b =β I (z ) is
Π
&
x ,β I (x )
'
−Π
&
x ,β I (z )
'
=
ˆ x
0
F (s )N−1 d s − (x − z )F (z )N−1−
ˆ z
0
F (s )N−1 d s
= (z −x )F (z )N−1−
ˆ 0
x
F (s )N−1 d s −
ˆ z
0
F (s )N−1 d s
= (z −x )F (z )N−1−
ˆ z
x
F (s )N−1 d s
We see that Π
$
x ,β I (x )
%
−Π
$
x ,β I (z )
%
≥ 0 independently if z − x ≥ 0 or otherwise,
as the Figure 3.1 shows. We use that F (x ) is an increasing function; if z − x ≥ 0 and
F (x ) is as increasing function then,
´ z
x F (s )
N−1 d s ≤ F (z )N−1
´ z
x d s . Then, we can
conclude that due toΠ
$
x ,β I (x )
%
−Π
$
x ,β I (z )
%
≥ 0, player i does not have incentives
to bid b = β I (z ) instead of β (x ).
Remark. β I (x ) = E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < x ] is a Nash equilibrium strategy but it could
not be the only equilibrium; we do not have unicity in the equilibrium strategies.
Corollary 3.1. β I (x ) = x −
´ x
0
F (z )N−1
F (x )N−1
d z
Proof.
β I (x ) =
1
F (x )N−1
ˆ x
0
(N −1)F (z )N−2 f (z )z d z
=
1
F (x )N−1
/
F (z )N−1 z
0x
0
−
ˆ x
0
F (z )N−1
F (x )N−1
d z
= x −
ˆ x
0
F (z )N−1
F (x )N−1
d z
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Figure 3.1: Π
$
x ,β I (x )
%
−Π
$
x ,β I (z )
%
≥ 0, if z −x ≥ 0 or otherwise
The above result shows that in the symmetric and increasing equilibrium of the
First Price Auction, each buyer bids below his valuation. Howmuch below depends
on the number N of bidders.
Example 3.1. Suppose, again, that the signals of the players follow a continuous
uniform distribution U (0,1), which means w = 1 and F (x ) = x and f (x ) = 1. We
could then calculate the equilibrium bid in a First Price Auction.
β I (x ) = x −
ˆ x
0
zN−1
xN−1
d z = x −
x
N
=
N −1
N
x < x = β I I (x )
3.2 Revenue Comparison
Now, having found the equilibrium strategy for the First Price Auctions, we can find
the expected payment to the auctioneer.
mI (x ) = Pr (Win)×Amount bid
= Pr (Y1:N−1 ≤ x )E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < x ]
= mII (x )
Thus, we have the same expected payment in the two price auctions. Then, the
ex ante expected payment and the expected revenue in the two auctions are the
same. Let us denote A as the number of the price auction, A = I or I I
E
/
mA(X )
0
=
ˆ ω
0
*ˆ x
0
z f 1:N−1(z ) d z
+
f (x ) dx
=
ˆ ω
0
*ˆ ω
z
f (x ) dx
+
z f 1:N−1(z ) d z
=
ˆ ω
0
z (1− F (z )) f 1:N−1(z ) d z
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Thus, the expected revenue will be E
-
RA
.
=
´ ω
0 x f 2:N (x ) dx = E [Y2:N ], as we
calculated in (2.4). Then, we can write a proposition to remember what we have
found.
Proposition 3.2. Let X1, . . . ,XN be independently and identically distributed ran-
dom variables that represent the private values of N bidders. Then, the ex ante ex-
pected payment and the expected revenue in a First Price Auction and in a Second
Price Auction is going to be the same.
We can say more about the distribution of prices in the two auctions. The
revenues in a Second Price Auction are more variable than in its First Price Auction.
In the Second Price Auction the prices can range between 0 and ω but in the First
Price Auction the prices can only range between 0 and E [Y1:N−1] .
The notion ofmean-preserving spread that we introduce now shows the fact that
the Second Price Auction is riskier than the First Price Auction.
Definition 3.1. Suppose X is a random variable with distribution function F . Let
Z be a random variable with distribution function H such that E [Z |X = x ] = 0 ∀x .
Suppose Y = X +Z with distribution function G , then we say that G is a mean-
preserving spread of F .
Let LA be the distribution of the equilibrium prices in a A Price Auction, A =
I or I I . Now, we are going to define what is a mean-preserving spread.
Now, we show that the distribution LI I is a mean-preserving spread of LI , which
means that the perspective of the auctioneer a Second Price Auction is riskier than
the First Price Auction because the bidder only will pay the second price.
Proposition 3.3. With independently and identically distributed private values, the
distribution LI I of equilibrium prices in a Second Price Auction is a mean-preserving
spread of the distribution LI of equilibrium prices in a First Price Auction.
Proof. Wesee that LI I = Y2:N , the price paidwill be the secondhighest order statistic,
and LI = β I (Y1:N ) , the price paid will be the offer of the highest order statistic.
Then,
E
/
LI I | LI = p
0
= E
/
Y2:N |β
I (Y1:N ) = p
0
= E
3
Y2:N | Y1:N =
&
β I
'−1 $
p
%4
= E
3
Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 <
&
β I
'−1 $
p
%4
=
&
β I
'5&
β I
'−1 $
p
%6
= p
In the third equality we use (2.3). Then, there exists a random variable Z such
that the distribution of LI I is the same as that of LI +Z and E
-
Z | LI = p
.
= 0, Then,
LI I is a mean-preserving spread of LI .
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Chapter 4
Reserve Prices
An auction has a reserve price r > 0 if the auctioneer would not sell the object in
case the object’s price obtained in the auction is lower than the reserve price. Now,
let us see what would be the impact of the reserve prices in the First and Second
Price Auctions.
Reserve Prices in Second Price Auctions
Suppose that the seller sets a reserve price, r > 0. Then, no bidder with a value x < r
is going to have positive payoff, hence, is not going to enter to the auction. Let us
find, now, the expected payment of a bidder with r ≤ x .
mII (x ,r ) =
ˆ x
0
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y
=
ˆ r
0
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y +
ˆ x
r
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y
= r FN−1 (r )+
ˆ x
r
y f 1,N−1
$
y
%
d y
Notice that, at least, the seller wins r even if the second highest bid is lower than r .
Reserve Prices in First Price Auctions
Knowing that the equilibrium in First Price Auctions is β I (x ) = E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < x ]
and that we need β I (r ) = r , because β I is a symmetric equilibrium of the First Price
Auction, then the strategy for any bidder with r ≤ x is
β I (x ) = E [max{r,Y1:N−1} | Y1:N−1 < x ]
= E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N−1 < x ]Pr (Y1:N−1 ≥ r )+
r Pr (Y1:N−1 ≤ r )
FN−1 (x )
= E [Y1:N−1 | r ≤ Y1:N−1 < x ]+
r
FN−1 (x )
FN−1 (r )
=
1
FN−1 (x )
ˆ x
r
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y +
r
FN−1 (x )
FN−1 (r ) (4.1)
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Hence, the expected payment of a bidder with value x ≤ r
m I (x ,r ) = Pr (Win)×Amount bid
= Pr (Y1:N−1 ≤ x )E [max{r,Y1:N−1} | Y1:N−1 < x ]
= FN−1 (x )E [max{r,Y1:N−1} | Y1:N−1 < x ]
=
ˆ x
r
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y + r FN−1 (r )
Where the last equality follows from (4.1).
Notice thatmI (x ,r ) =mII (x ,r ) and also the ex ante expected payment and the
expected revenue are the same.
Revenue Effects of Reserve Prices
As we did before, we are going to calculate de ex ante expected payment.
E
/
mA (x ,r )
0
=
ˆ ω
r
mA (x ,r ) f (x ) dx
=
ˆ ω
r
*ˆ x
r
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y + r FN−1 (r )
+
f (x ) dx
= r FN−1 (r )
ˆ w
r
f (x ) dx +
ˆ ω
r
*ˆ x
r
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y
+
f (x ) dx
= r FN−1 (r ) (1− F (r ))+
ˆ ω
r
y
$
1− F
$
y
%%
f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y
In the last equality we use Fubini’s Theorem.
Is there an optimal auction?
Let us suppose that the seller attaches a value x0 ∈ [0,w ). Then, if the object is unsold
the auctioneer would set a reserve price r greater than x0, r ≥ x0. What would be the
expected payoff?
Π0 (x0,r ) = N × E
/
mA (X ,r )
0
+ F (r )N x0
= N
*
r FN−1 (r ) (1− F (r ))+
ˆ ω
r
y
$
1− F
$
y
%%
f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y
+
+ F (r )N x0
Now, we want to find out which reserve price r would be optimal for this seller.
Differentiating the above expression with respect to r , we obtain
dΠ0
d r
(x0,r ) = x0NF (r )
N−1 f (r )+N
&
FN−1 (r ) (1− F (r ))− r FN−1 (r ) f (r )
'
= N
$
1− F (r )− (r −x0) f (r )
%
FN−1 (r )
= N
*
1− (r −x0)
f (r )
1− F (r )
+
FN−1 (r ) (1− F (r ))
Then, knowing that the hazard rate is defined as λ (x ) = f (x )1−F (x ) , we have that
dΠ0
d r
= N (1− (r −x0)λ (r ))FN−1 (r ) (1− F (r ))
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Remark. Notice that if x0 = 0 then,
dΠ0
d r
(0,0) = N (1)FN−1 (0) (1− F (0)) = 0, but if
r " 0, then dΠ0
d r
(0,r ) = N (1− rλ (r ))FN−1 (r ) (1− F (r )). If λ (r ) is bounded and due
to r is small, then dΠ0
d r
(0,r ) > 0, then at r = 0 there is a minimum of the expected
payment.
If x0 > 0, then
dΠ0
d r
(x0,x0) =N (1)FN−1 (x0) (1− F (x0))> 0.
Returning to our initial problem, we want to find the optimal reserve price r ∗,
then
dΠ0
d r
(x0,r ) = 0
1−
$
r ∗ −xo
%
λ
$
r ∗
%
= 0
r ∗ −
1
λ (r ∗)
= x0
Notice that ifλ (·) is increasing, then x0 < r . Also, it is remarkable that the optimal
reserve prices does not depend on the number of bidders. It seems that the reserve
price comes into play only when there is a single bidder with a value that exceeds
the reserve price, x > r .
26
Chapter 5
The Revenue Equivalence
Principle
In the previous chapter we have seen that a risk neutral seller is indifferent between
the First and Second Price Auctions, but these two auctions are not strategically
equivalent since the equilibrium strategy for both of them is different
5.1 A General Auction Format
By now, the auction forms we consider all have the feature that buyers must submit
bids. These amounts of money are the only thing that determines who wins the
object and howmuch is going to pay. Then, we can define what an standard auction
is.
Definition 5.1. An auction is standard if the rules of an auction determines that the
person who bids the highest amount wins the object.
Notice that Definition 5.1 does not say that the person who values the object the
most wins.
Also, notice that the First and Second Price Auctions are standard auctions but
a lottery is a nonstandard method because a player with one ticket could win the
lottery against a person who has eight tickets.
Let A be an standard auction, βA a symmetric equilibrium of the auction and
letmA (x ) be the equilibrium expected payment by a bidder with value x . We must
emphasize that the expected payment with value 0 is 0.
Next proposition shows that the expected payment does not depend on the
standard auction form.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that values are independently and identically distributed
and all bidders are risk neutral. Then any symmetric and increasing equilibrium of
any standard auction, such that the expected payment of a bidder with value zero is
zero, yields the same expected revenue to the seller.
Proof. Let A be an standard auction, with a symmetric equilibrium βA and expected
paymentmA (x ). Suppose thatmA (0) = 0. We must remember that
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mA (x ) = Pr(Win)×Amount bid
Suppose that all players except one follow βA (x ) , we could assume that the one
that is not following βA (x ) bids βA (z ). What would be this buyer’s expected payoff?
Π (z ,x ) =
$
x −p
%
×Pr (Win)
= x ×Pr (Win)−p ×Pr (Win)
= xF1:N−1 (z )−m
A (z )
The maximization condition is:
∂ Π (z ,x )
∂ z
= 0
x f 1:N−1 (z )−
dmA (z )
d z
= 0
and since β (x )is an equilibrium strategy, the maximum is attained at z = x .
dmA (x )
dx
= x f 1:N−1 (x )
mA (x ) = mA (0)+
ˆ x
0
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y
=
ˆ x
0
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y (5.1)
Notice that mA (x ) does not depend on A and hence the expected payment of
a bidder does not depend on the auction format, and the same happens with the
expected revenue of the seller.
5.2 Some Applications
All-Pay Auctions
Each bidder submits a bid and the highest bidder wins the object auctioned, but
everybody pays his bid. Suppose that we have a symmetric, increasing equilibrium
of the All-Pay Auction such that the expected payment of a bidder with value 0
is 0. Due to (5.1) we know that the expected payment is mAP (x ) = mA (x ) =´ x
0 y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y . On the other hand, we know that what the bidders pay is exactly
what they offer, then
βAP (x ) = mAP (x )
=
ˆ x
0
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y
But, is βAP (x ) an equilibrium? To see it we proceed as usual in these cases,
we suppose that one bidder does not follow βAP (x ) but follows βAP (z ), then the
expected payoff of a bidder with value x is
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Πi (x ,z ) =
$
x −p
%
Pr (Win)−p Pr (Lose)
= x Pr (Win)−p (Pr (Win)+Pr (Lose))
= x Pr (Win)−p
= xF1:N−1 (z )−β
AP (z )
= xF1:N−1 (z )−
ˆ z
0
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y
= (x − z )F1:N−1 (z )−
ˆ z
0
F1:N−1
$
y
%
d y
In the last equality we integrate the second term by parts. We have the same
result as we have in (3.1), then if we do the same procedure we reach that we
maximizeΠi (x ,z )when z = x . Thus, βAP is a symmetric and increasing equilibrium.
Equilibriumof Third Price Auctions
Suppose that we have at least three bidders. Consider a sealed-bid auction where
the highest bidder wins the object but, as the name suggests, pays the third highest
bid.
As we know, the expected payment ismII I (x ) =mA (x ) =
´ x
0 y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y , but
wemust answer to the question: what is the strategy to follow?
To begin with, if the bidder 1 wins in equilibrium with value x means that the
signal of the second best player is lower than his signal, x , then Y1:N−1 < x . The
price bidder 1 pays is the second highest bid of the other N − 1 players, which
means β I I I (Y2:N−1). Then, we must calculate f 2:N−1
$
y | Y1 < x
%
before we continue
our procedure.
First of all, we recall that f 2:N−1
$
y
%
= (N −1)
$
1− F
$
y
%%
f 1:N−2
$
y
%
due to (2.2).
Then,
f 2:N−1
$
y | Y1 < x
%
=
1
F1:N−1 (x )
(N −1)
$
F (x )− F
$
y
%%
f 1:N−2
$
y
%
We have the factor 1
F1:N−1(x )
because it is the distribution function of Y1:N−1 and
(N −1)
$
F (x )− F
$
y
%%
is de probability that Y1:N−1 exceeds Y2:N−1 but is less than x .
On the other hand, the expected payment would be
mII I (x ) = Pr(Win)×Amount bid
= F1:N−1 (x )E
/
β I I I (Y2:N−1) | Y1:N−1 < x
0
= F1:N−1 (x )
ˆ x
0
β I I I
$
y
%
f 2:N−1
$
y | Y1 < x
%
d y
=
ˆ x
0
β I I I
$
y
%
(N −1)
$
F (x )− F
$
y
%%
f 1:N−2
$
y
%
d y
Then, if we equate the two expected payments in a Third Price Auction then, we
have
ˆ x
0
β I I I
$
y
%
(N −1)
$
F (x )− F
$
y
%%
f 1:N−2
$
y
%
d y =
ˆ x
0
y f 1:N−1
$
y
%
d y
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Differentiating with respect to x then,
(N −1) f (x )
ˆ x
0
β I I I
$
y
%
f 1:N−2
$
y
%
d y = x f 1:N−1 (x )
We have used the Leibniz Formula which says: Let F (x ) =
´ h(x )
g (x ) f
$
y ,x
%
d y then
differentiating with respect to x wehave F ′ (x ) = h ′ (x ) f (h (x ) ,x )−g ′ (x ) f
$
g (x ) ,x
%
+´ h(x )
g (x )
∂ f (y ,x)
∂ x
d y . Rearranging the equality we arrive to
ˆ x
0
β I I I
$
y
%
f 1:N−2
$
y
%
d y = x (F (x ))N−2
Notice that we only use that f 1:N−1 = (N −1) f (x ) (F (x ))
N−2.
If we differentiate, again, with respect to x
β I I I (x ) f 1:N−2 (x ) = (F (x ))
N−2+x (N −2) (F (x ))N−3 f (x )
and rearranging once again
β I I I (x ) =
(F (x ))N−2+x (N −2) (F (x ))N−3 f (x )
f 1:N−2 (x )
=
(F (x ))N−2+x (N −2) (F (x ))N−3 f (x )
(N −2) (F (x ))N−3 f (x )
=
F (x )
(N −2) f (x )
+x
This derivation is valid only if β I I I (x ) is increasing thus, we need that F
f
is
increasing. This condition is the same as F is log-concave.
Remark. Notice that β I I I (x ) > x which means that the player bids more than he
values the object.
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Chapter 6
Risk-Averse Bidders
In this chapter, we analyze what happens if bidders are risk-averse. We maintain
all assumptions we have been working with, like independence of values, symmetry
among bidders and absence of reserve prices.
The expected payoff of a risk-neutral bidder is just the difference between his
expected gain and his expected payment, i.e. Π (x ) =
$
x −p
%
Pr (Win) = x Pr (Win)−
p Pr (Win), but an averse or risk-loving bidder does not have this expected payoff
because depends on his utility function.
Suppose that the bidder is risk-averse, then he must have an utility function
strictly concave
u :!+ −→ !
x )→ u (x )
i.e. u ′ > 0, u ′′ < 0 and satisfies u (0) = 0. Now, the expected payment will be
Π (x ) = u
$
x −p
%
Pr (Win).[4]
Proposition 6.1. Suppose that bidders are risk-averse with the same utility function.
If we suppose symmetric, independent private values then the expected revenue in a
First Price Auction is greater than that in a Second Price Auction.
Proof. Firstly, notice that in a Second Price Auction with a risk-averse bidder it is
a dominant strategy to bid his value, due to the same argument we used in the
Proposition 2.1. Thus, the expected payment would be the same as for a risk-neutral
bidder.
Now, let us see what happens with a First Price Auction. Suppose that exists an
equilibrium strategy given by an increasing and differentiable function
γI : [0,ω] −→ !+
x )→ γI (x )
satisfying γI (0) = 0. If all bidders except one follow this strategy, the one that is
not following this strategy, with a signal x would bid γI (z ) where z ∈ [0,ω] and
γI (z )< γI (ω). Now, we want to maximize his expected payoff
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Figure 6.1: Plot of β I and γI
Π (x ,z ) = u
&
x −γI (z )
'
Pr (Win)
= u
&
x −γI (z )
'
F1:N−1 (z )
The first order condition is
∂ Π (x ,z )
∂ z
= 0
−
&
γI
'′
(z )u ′
&
x −γI (z )
'
F1:N−1 (z )+u
&
x −γI (z )
'
f 1:N−1 (z ) = 0
In a symmetric equilibrium, it must be optimal to do z = x . Rearranging the
equation we have
&
γI
'′
(x ) =
u
$
x −γI (x )
%
u ′
$
x −γI (x )
% f 1:N−1 (x )
F1:N−1 (x )
If the bidder were risk-neutral, u (x ) = x , then
&
β I
'′
(x ) =
&
x −γI (x )
' f 1:N−1 (x )
F1:N−1 (x )
Now, due to the fact that u is a strictly concave function and u (0) = 0, u (x )
u ′(x )
>
x ∀x > 0 we could say
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&
γI
'′
(x ) =
u
$
x −γI (x )
%
u ′
$
x −γI (x )
% f 1:N−1 (x )
F1:N−1 (x )
>
&
x −γI (x )
' f 1:N−1 (x )
F1:N−1 (x )
Now if β I (x )> γI (x ) then
&
γI
'′
(x ) >
&
x −γI (x )
' f 1:N−1 (x )
F1:N−1 (x )
>
&
x −β I (x )
' f 1:N−1 (x )
F1:N−1 (x )
=
&
β I
'′
(x )
Also we have that β I (0) = γI (0) = 0.
To summarize, we have that β I (x ) > γI (x ) ⇒
$
γI
%′
(x ) >
$
β I
%′
(x ) and β I (0) =
γI (0) = 0. But is it really happening β I (x )> γI (x )?
If we suppose that, as the Figure 6.1 shows us, we have that β I (x ) < γI (x ).
Thus, in a First Price Auction with risk aversion, the expected price in equilibrium
bids increases. Due to the unaffection by risk aversion in a Second Price Auction
the expected revenue in a First Price Auction is higher than that in a Second Price
Auction.
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Part III
Interdependent-value Auctions
34
Chapter 7
Introduction and preliminaries
In this latest part we are going to analyze how the First and Second Price Auctions
react when the valuation of the bidders does not depend only on their own value
(that was the case in Part II) but on the others too.
Interdependent valuesmeans that a bidder i could only have partial information
and the information of other bidders affect the value he assigns to the object. Then,
bidder i ’s value of the object, Vi , can be expressed as
Vi = vi (X1, . . . ,XN )
where Xj ∈
/
0.ωj
0
is the random variable called j ’s signal that is bidder’s j private
information; vi is bidder i ’s valuation which is a nondecreasing function in all its
variables and we will assume for technical reasons that it is twice continuously
differentiable. Also, it is assumed that vi is strictly increasing in Xi . Thus, at this
stage, if bidder i would know the signal of all buyers, including its own value, then
he would deduce the actual value of the object. In this new scenario is not always
the natural one; for instance, for the art auction one could think that each bidder has
its own opinion no matter the value of the others. However, in other situations like
the companies interested in a radioelectrical license where one frequency is more
important than the others for one specific radio station and everybody knows it.
However, a general formulation could start supposing that V1, . . . ,VN are the
unknown N values of the bidders; X1, . . . ,XN are, as before, the N bidders signals.
In that case, we could think that the function that allows us to calculate the value of
the object depending on the signals of all bidders it could be defined as the expected
value to i conditional on all the information available to bidders
vi (x1, . . . ,xN ) ≡ E [Vi |X1 = x1, . . . ,XN = xN ]
Then, due to the knowing of x1, . . . ,xN the bidder i could find an estimator of
Vi but not the exact value. For example, if vi (x1,x2) =
1
2 (x1 +x2) this would be an
estimator of Vi .
Remark. We suppose that
• vi (0, . . . ,0) = 0
• E [Vi ]<+∞
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• Bidders are risk neutral which means that each bidder maximizes the
expectation of Vi −pi where pi is the price the bidder i pays.
Also, notice that in private values
vi (x1, . . . ,xN ) ≡ E [Vi |X1 = x1, . . . ,XN = xN ]
= E [Vi |Xi = xi ]
= xi
for all bidders which means that the value of the object for a bidder i only depends
on him.
In the case we had common values, the value of the object V is obtained
evaluating the same function v ; vi (x1, . . . ,xN ) = vj (x1, . . . ,xN ) for all i , j = 1, . . . ,N
then, we could write V = v (X1, . . . ,XN ).
7.1 Affiliation
In some cases, we consider that the bidders’ signal is correlated, for example, if
a bidder i receives a higher signal it is because the other bidders also have a
higher signal with high probability. Thus, there is no reason to the joint density
of the bidders’ signals be equal to the product of individual signals’ densities,
f X1,...,XN (x1, . . . ,xN ) ̸=
∏N
j=0 f X j
&
x j
'
.
Definition 7.1. Let X1, . . . ,XN be the random variables distributed on subspace of
!N ,X⊂!N , according to the joint density of X1, . . . ,XN , denoted by f X1,...,XN . We say
that X1, . . . ,XN are affiliated if for all x ′,x ′′ ∈X
f X1,...,XN
$
x ′ ∨x ′′
%
f X1,...,XN
$
x ′ ∧x ′′
%
≥ f X1,...,XN
$
x ′
%
f X1,...,XN
$
x ′′
%
where
x ′ ∨x ′′ =
&
max
8
x ′1,x
′′
1
9
, . . . ,max
8
x ′N ,x
′′
N
9'
and
x ′ ∧x ′′ =
&
min
8
x ′1,x
′′
1
9
, . . . ,min
8
x ′N ,x
′′
N
9'
Let X1, . . . ,XN be the bidders’ signals; Y1:N , . . . ,YN−1:N , the highest, the second
highest,... smallest random variable from among X2,X3 . . . ,XN . If X1, . . . ,XN are
affiliated, then X1,Y1:N , . . . ,YN−1:N are also affiliated.
Let G (· | x ) be the distribution of Y1:N conditional on X1 = x . Then, if x ′ > x in
terms of the reverse hazard rate, for all y ,
g
$
y | x ′
%
G
$
y | x ′
% ≥ g $y | x%
G
$
y | x
%
Furthermore, if γ is an increasing function then, if x ′ > x then
E
-
γ (Y1:N ) |X1 = x
′
.
≥ E
-
γ (Y1:N ) |X1 = x
.
(7.1)
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Chapter 8
Different Auctions Formats
As we have considered in the case of private value auctions, with interdependent
values also we split in different scenarios depending on the precise mechanism we
use.
8.1 Second Price Auctions
Wewant to give a symmetric equilibrium in a Second Price Sealed-bid Auction with
interdependent values.
Firstly, with interdependent values and affiliated signals there are two aspects to
symmetry:
• The bidders’ signals, Xi for i = 1, . . . ,N , live in the same interval [0,ω].
• vi (X1, . . . ,XN ) = u (Xi ,X−i ) where the function u is the same for all bidders
and is symmetric in the lastN −1 components. As an example, suppose N = 3
then u
$
x ,y ,z
%
=u
$
x ,z ,y
%
where x ,y ,z are the signals of the the first, second
and third bidder, respectively.
Also, we assumed that the joint density of the signals, f , is defined on [0,ω]N , is a
symmetric function of its arguments.
Definition 8.1. We define the function below as the expectation of the value to
bidder 1 conditioned by the signal received by him, x , and also the highest signal
among the other bidders is y
v
$
x ,y
%
= E
-
V1 |X1 = x ,Y1:N = y
.
Notice that:
• v
$
x ,y
%
is the same function for all bidders because of its symmetry.
• Due to (7.1) v
$
x ,y
%
is nondecreasing function of x and y .
Proposition 8.1. Symmetric equilibrium strategies in a Second Price Auction are
given by:
β I I (x ) = v (x ,x )
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Proof. Suppose for all bidders except one, this one we call it i , follow the strategy
β I I . As we have proceed before, the bidder i with x signal bidsb . Then, his expected
payoff would be
Π (b ,x ) =
ˆ (β I I )−1(b )
0
&
v
$
x ,y
%
−β I I (x )
'
g
$
y | x
%
d y
=
ˆ (β I I )−1(b )
0
$
v
$
x ,y
%
− v
$
y ,y
%%
g
$
y | x
%
d y
where v
$
x ,y
%
is the bidder i ’s expected valuation, v
$
y ,y
%
is the price that the
bidder i is going to pay if the others follow β I I and g
$
y | x
%
is the probability of
success.
We know that v
$
x ,y
%
is increasing in the first argument, then for all y > x ,
v
$
x ,y
%
− v
$
y ,y
%
> 0 and for all y > x , v
$
x ,y
%
− v
$
y ,y
%
< 0. Thus, we choose b
such tat
$
β I I
%−1
(b ) = x⇒b = β I I (x ).
What does really mean β I I (x ) = v (x ,x )?
The bidder i makes an offer such that if the second highest bidder offers the
same as him, then his profit would be 0. If the second highest bid were higher than
the i ’s offer he could lose.
Proposition 8.2. The equilibrium strategy β I I (x ) = v (x ,x ) is unique in the class of
symmetric equilibrium.
Proof.
Π (b ,x ) =
ˆ (β I I )−1(b )
0
&
v
$
x ,y
%
−β I I
$
y
%'
g
$
y | x
%
d y
Then, to maximize the expected payoff wemust differentiate with respect to b :
∂ Π
∂ b
(b ,x ) = 05
v
5
x ,
&
β I I
'−1
(b )
6
−β I I
5&
β I I
'−1
(b )
66
g
5&
β I I
'−1
(b ) | x
6 &$
β I I
%−1'′
(b ) = 0
5
v
5
x ,
&
β I I
'−1
(b )
6
−b
6 g &$β I I %−1 (b ) | x'&$
β I I
%′'$$
β I I
%
−1 (b )
% = 0
v
5
x ,
&
β I I
'−1
(b )
6
= b
Example 8.1. Suppose that there are three bidders with a common value V that is
uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Given V = v bidders’ signal Xi are uniformly and
independently distributed on [0,2v ]. Find the equilibrium strategy for a Second
Price Auction.
We want to find v
$
x ,y
%
= E
-
V |Xi = x ,Y1:2 = y
.
, then for that, we need to find
the expectation of the value to a bidder i and conditional densities.
Let be X = (X1,X2,X3) andZ =max{X1,X2,X3} a random variable.
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To begin with, the density of Xi conditional on V = v is f (Xi | V = v ) =
1
2v ,
v ∈ [0,2v ]. The joint density of (V,X ) is f (V,X ) (x ,v ) = 1 ×
&
1
2v
'3
on the set
{(V,X ) |∀i ,Xi ≤ 2V }. But, notice that what we know about V is only that V ≥
1
2Z .
Then, the joint density of X is:
f (x1,x2,x3) =
ˆ 1
z/2
f (V,X ) (x ,v ) d v =
ˆ 1
z/2
*
1
2v
+3
d v
=
4− z 2
16z 2
where z =max{x1,x2,x3}. Thus, on the interval v ∈
/
z
2 ,1
0
f (v |X = x ) = f (v |Z = z ) =
f (V,X ) (x ,v )
f (z )
=
&
1
2v
'3
4−z 2
16z 2
=
1
8v 3
×
16z 2
4− z 2
Thus,
E [V |X = x ] = E [V |Z = z ] =
ˆ 1
z/2
v f (v |Z = z ) d v
=
ˆ 1
z/2
1
8v 2
×
16z 2
4− z 2
d v =
16z 2
4− z 2
ˆ 1
z/2
1
8v 2
d v
=
16z 2
4− z 2
=
2− z
z
2z
2+ z
Due to z = max {x1,x2,x3} and Y1:2 = max{X2,X3} and Z = max{X1,X2,X3}, Z =
max{X1,Y1:2} then
v
$
x ,y
%
= E
-
V |X1 = x ,Y1:2 = y
.
= E
-
V |Z =max
:
x ,y
;.
=
2max
:
x ,y
;
2+max
:
x ,y
;
Now, from Proposition 8.2 we have
β I I (x ) = v (x ,x ) =
2x
2+x
8.2 English Auctions
In an Open Ascending Auction, or English Auction, the bidders are known and also
what they are bidding in each moment.
Due to the variety of open ascending price formats, we accept the one that the
auctioneer sets the price at zero and the bidders signal to the auctioneer of accepting
this price is by raising a hand, pushing a button, holding a sign, etc. Thus, each
39
bidder knows what the others are doing in every moment. A bidder may drop out
whenever he want but in this case he could not reenter the auction. The auction
ends when only remains one bidder and he pays the last price the auctioneer said.
Notice that in an English Auction there is not a unique equilibrium because
the auction is in a constant change. Then, a symmetric equilibrium strategy is a
collection of N −1 functions
β =
&
βN ,βN−1, . . . ,β 2
'
where
β k : [0,1]×!N−k
+
−→ !+$
x ;pk+1, . . . ,pN
%
)−→ β k
$
x ;pk+1, . . . ,pN
%
for 1< k ≤N . β k
$
x ;pk+1, . . . ,pN
%
is the price at which the player 1 would drop out
if there are k bidders who are still active and pk+1 ≥ · · · ≥ pN are the dropped out
prices of the other N −k players.
Now, we give the equilibrium strategies for the bidders. Suppose that when all
bidders are in the auction
βN (x , . . . ,x ) = u (x ,x , . . . ,x )
where βN (·) is a continuous and increasing function.
Now, suppose that bidderN is the first to abandon the auction at a price pN and
let xN be the unique signal such that βN (xN , . . . ,xN ) = pN . Then, when some bidder
drops out at this price, pN , now the other N −1 bidders follow the strategy
βN−1
$
x ,pN
%
= u (x , . . . ,x ,xN )
where βN (xN , . . . ,xN ) = pN . Also, βN−1
$
·,pN
%
is a continuos and increasing
function.
Now, proceeding recursively,
pk+1 := β k+1
$
xk+1,pk+2, . . . ,pN
%
(8.1)
where pk+1 is the price when the bidder k +1 drops out of the auction.
Now let the remaining k bidders in the auction follow the strategy
β k
$
x ,pk+1, . . . ,pN
%
= u (x , . . . ,x ,xk+1, . . . ,xN )
This function gives us the abandon price when there are only k bidders in the
auction and the other N −k dropped out with prices pN , . . . ,pk+1.
But, why is these strategies a symmetric equilibrium?
To beginwith, let us suppose the biddersk+1,k+2. . . ,N have dropped out, then,
there are only k bidders remaining in the auction. Knowing that the k+1,k+2. . . ,N
abandoned the auction we know in which price they did it, then, their signals
xk+1,xk+2 . . . ,xN are known by the other bidders.
Suppose that bidder 1 has a signal x and the other k − 1 bidders are following
β k . The bidder 1 thinks about dropping out at the current price p or continue.
But, what happens if he does not drop out and pays p ? If this is to occur,
the other k − 1 players drop out at p and the only way that this could happen
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is if the k − 1 bidders their signal is y , the same for each bidder, such that
β k
$
y ,pk+1, . . . ,pN
%
= p = u
$
y , . . . ,y ,pk+1, . . . ,pN
%
, then the value of the object
auctioned is u
$
y , . . . ,y ,pk+1, . . . ,pN
%
. Thus, bidder 1 would continue in the auction
if and only if u
$
y , . . . ,y ,pk+1, . . . ,pN
%
> p , which means only if x = y .
Proposition 8.3. In an English Auction the symmetric equilibrium strategies are
given byβN (x , . . . ,x ) = u (x ,x , . . . ,x ) andβ k
$
x ,pk+1, . . . ,pN
%
= u (x , . . . ,x ,xk+1, . . . ,xN ).
Proof. Suppose that bidder 1 has a signal X1 = x , the other N −1 bidders follow the
strategy β .
Suppose the realizations of Y1:N−1, . . . ,YN−1:N−1 denoted by y1, . . . ,yN−1, are such
that the bidder 1 wins the auction following β . Then, x > y1. The price that he
pays is the price that the second highest signal, y1, drops out and that would be
u
$
y1,y1,y2, . . . ,yN
%
. But he would win u
$
x ,y1,y2, . . . ,yN
%
, thus he would want to
follow β .
If the bidder 1 does not win following β means that x < y1 and this argument
makes that
u
$
x ,y1,y2, . . . ,yN
%
−u
$
y ,y1,y2, . . . ,yN
%
< 0
Remark. Notice that the equilibrium strategy does not depend on the distribution
of signals f , but on the distribution of values u .
8.3 First Price Auctions
Let us suppose that j ̸= 1 bidders follow an increasing and differentiable strategy β .
Everybody, including the bidder 1, makes an offer in the interval
-
β (0) = 0,β (w )
.
.
Let G (· | x ) be the distribution function of Y1:N−1 = maxi ̸=1Xi conditional on
X1 = x . And, also, let g (· | x ) be its density function.
Now, the bidder 1 with signal x but he bidsβ (z ), then, his expected payoff would
be:
Π (x ,z ) =
ˆ z
0
$
v
$
x ,y
%
−β (z )
%
g
$
y | x
%
d y
=
ˆ z
0
v
$
x ,y
%
g
$
y | x
%
d y −β (z )G (z | x )
The first order condition is
v (x ,z ) g (z | x )−β ′ (z )G (z | x )−β (z ) g (z | x ) = 0
At a symmetric equilibrium, the optimal z = x , then, rearranging and setting
z = x the equation we have
β ′ (x ) =
$
v (x ,x )−β (x )
% g (x | x )
G (x | x )
(8.2)
Now, we have that linear differential equation that wemust that v (x ,x )−β (x )≥
0 because otherwise β would not be an increasing function. Also, due to v (0,0) = 0
we have that β (0) = 0. Thus, the Cauchy problem that we have is:)
β ′ (x ) =
$
v (x ,x )−β (x )
% g (x |x )
G (x |x )
β (0) = 0
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β (x ) = e
−
´ x
0
g (y |y )
G (y |y )
d y
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
% g $y | y %
G
$
y | y
% e ´ y0 g (s |s )G (s |s ) d s d y
=
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
% g $y | y %
G
$
y | y
% e ´ y0 g (s |s )G (s |s ) d s e−´ x0 g (s |s )G (s |s ) d s d y
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
% g $y | y %
G
$
y | y
% e−´ xt g (s |s )G (s |s ) d s d y
Now, we define
L
$
y | x
%
:= e−
´ x
y
g (s |s )
G (s |s )
d s
Then,
d
d y
L
$
y | x
%
=
g
$
y | y
%
G
$
y | y
%e−´ xy g (s |s )G (s |s ) d s
Thus,
β (x ) =
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
%
d L
$
y | x
%
But, by now we have not said that this is a symmetric equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 8.4. In a Sealed-bid First Price Auction the symmetric equilibrium
strategy is given by
β I (x ) =
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
%
d L
$
y | x
%
where
L
$
y | x
%
= e−
´ x
y
g (s |s )
G (s |s )
d s
Proof. Firstly, notice that you could think L
$
y | x
%
as a distribution function with
support [0,x ].
g
$
y | y
%
G
$
y | y
% ≥ g $y | 0%
G
$
y | 0
% (8.3)
−
ˆ x
0
g
$
y | y
%
G
$
y | y
% d y ≤ −ˆ x
0
g
$
y | 0
%
G
$
y | 0
% d y
= −
ˆ x
0
d
d y
$
lnG
$
y | 0
%%
d y
= −
ˆ x
0
d
d y
$
lnG
$
y | 0
%%
d y
= lnG (0 | 0)− lnG (x | 0)
= ln0− lnG (x | 0)
= −∞
In then, in (8.3) we use affiliation. Then,
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L (0 | x ) = e−
´ x
0
g (s |s )
G (s |s )
d s = e−∞ = 0
L (x | x ) = e−
´ x
x
g (s |s )
G (s |s )
d s = e 0 = 1
L (· | x ) is a non-decreasing function then, L (· | x ) is a distribution function.
Also, if x < x ′ then L (· | x ) ≥ L (· | x ′) which means that L (· | x ′) stochastically
dominates the distribution L (· | x ) .
Since v
$
y ,y
%
> 0 then β I is an increasing function.
Now, what it lasts is see that β I is a maximum.
We proceed as usual, a bidder with signal x bids β I (z ). Then, the expected profit
would be
Π (x ,z ) =
ˆ z
0
&
v
$
x ,y
%
−β I (z )
'
f
$
y | x
%
d y
Then, the first order condition is
∂
∂ z
Π (x ,z ) = v (x ,z ) g (z | x )−
&
β I
'′
(z )G (z | x )−β I (z ) g (z | x )
=
&
v (x ,z )−β I (z )
'
g (z | x )−
&
β I
'′
(z )G (z | x )
= G (z | x )
1&
v (x ,z )−β I (z )
' g (z | x )
G (z | x )
−
&
β I
'′
(z )
2
We want to see that ∂
∂ z
Π (x ,z ) > 0. If z < x then, v (x ,z ) > v (x ,x ) due to v is an
increasing function, and because of affiliation g (z |x )
G (z |x )
>
g (z |z )
G (z |z )
.
∂
∂ z
Π (x ,z ) > G (z | x )
1&
v (z ,z )−β I (z )
' g (z | z )
G (z | z )
−
&
β I
'′
(z )
2
= 0
Using (8.2) . Now, let us see the case x < z then, v (z ,z )> v (x ,z ) due to v is an
increasing function, and because of affiliation g (z |x )
G (z |x )
>
g (z |z )
G (z |z )
.
∂
∂ z
Π (x ,z ) < G (z | x )
1&
v (z ,z )−β I (z )
' g (z | z )
G (z | z )
−
&
β I
'′
(z )
2
= 0
Thus, ∂
∂ z
Π (x ,z ) = 0 when z = x .
Remark. The Proposition 8.2 is a generalization of Proposition 3.1, where v
$
y ,y
%
=
y because of private values and also the signals are independent, then G (· | x ) ≡
G (x ). Thus,
L
$
y | x
%
= e−
´ x
y
g (t )
G (t )
d t = e
ln
<
G (x )
G (y )
=−1
=
G
$
y
%
G (x )
Then,
β I (x ) =
ˆ x
0
y
g (y )
G (x )
d y
= E [Y1:N−1 | Y1:N-1 < x ]
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Chapter 9
Further Considerations
9.1 Revenue Comparisons
Now, what we compare is the revenue according to the format, First Price, Second
Price and English Auction.
Proposition 9.1. E
-
REng
.
≥ E
-
RI I
.
.
Proof. Remembering that β I I (x ) = v (x ,x ) is the symmetric equilibrium strategy in
a Second Price Auction, if x > y ,
v
$
y ,y
%
= E
-
u (X1,Y1:N−1,Y2:N−1, . . . ,YN−1:N−1) |X1 = y ,Y1:N−1 = y
.
= E
-
u (Y1:N−1,Y1:N−1,Y2:N−1, . . . ,YN−1:N−1) |X1 = y ,Y1:N−1 = y
.
≤ E
-
u (Y1:N−1,Y1:N−1, . . . ,YN−1:N−1) | X1 = x ,Y1:N−1 = y
.
(9.1)
In (9.1) we use that u is an increasing in all its arguments and all signals are
affiliated. Then, the expected revenue in a Second Price Auction would be
E
/
RI I
0
= E
/
β I I (Y1:N-1) |X1 > Y1:N−1
0
= E [v (Y1:N-1,Y1:N−1) |X1 > Y1:N−1]
≤ E
-
E
-
u (Y1:N−1,Y1:N−1, . . . ,YN−1:N−1) |X1 = x ,Y1:N−1 = y
.
|X1 > Y1:N−1
.
= E [u (Y1:N−1,Y1:N−1, . . . ,YN−1:N−1) |X1 > Y1:N−1]
= E
/
β 2 (Y1:N -1,Y2:N−1, . . . ,YN−1:N−1)
0
= R
/
REng
0
where in the equality we have used (9.1) and then in the next equality we used
the Proposition 8.3, β 2 is the strategy used in an English Auction when only two
players remain, which is the price paid by the winning bidder because is the price
when the other player decides to drop out due to (8.1).
Proposition 9.2. E
-
RI I
.
≥ E
-
RI
.
.
Proof. To begin with, in a First Price Auction the payment of a bidder upon winning
the object is just β I (x ) as we defined in Proposition 8.4. On the other hand, the
expected payment in a Second Price Auction is E
-
β I I (Y1:N−1) | X1 = x ,Y1:N−1
.
where
β I I is defined in Proposition 8.2.
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Now, if we develop the expected payment in a Second Price Auction
E
/
β I I (Y1:N−1) |X1 = x ,Y1:N−1
0
= E [v (Y1:N−1,Y1:N−1) |X1 = x ,Y1:N−1 < x ]
=
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
% g $y | x%
G (x | x )
d y
=
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
%
d K
where for all y < x ,
K
$
y | x
%
=
G
$
y | x
%
G (x | x )
Notice that K (· | x ) is a distribution function with support [0,x ] because
• K (· | x ) is an increasing function due toG (· | x ) is a distribution function.
• K (0 | x ) = G (0|x )
G (x |x )
= 0
• K (x | x ) = G (x |x )
G (x |x )
= 1
On the other hand,
β I (x ) =
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
%
d L
$
y | x
%
where
L
$
y | x
%
= e−
´ x
y
g (s |s )
G (s |s )
d s
Then, what we want to see if
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
%
d L
$
y | x
%
≤
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
%
d K
$
y | x
%
occurs. This would happen if and only if
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
%$
d K
$
y | x
%
−d L
$
y | x
%%
≥ 0
and integrating by parts, we obtain
−
ˆ x
0
v ′
$
y ,y
%$
K
$
y | x
%
− L
$
y | x
%%
d y ≥ 0
ˆ x
0
v ′
$
y ,y
%$
L
$
y | x
%
−K
$
y | x
%%
d y ≥ 0
since v ′
$
y ,y
%
> 0 because is an increasing function wemust have that L
$
y | x
%
−
K
$
y | x
%
≥ 0 ⇔ L
$
y | x
%
≥ K
$
y | x
%
, which means that K (· | x ) stochastically
dominates L (· | x ).
To proof the stochastic dominanceweuse that because of affiliation, for all t < x ,
G (· | x ) dominatesG (· | t ) in terms of the reverse hazard rate, then
g (t | t )
G (t | t )
≤
g (t | x )
G (t | x )
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then, for all y < x ,
g (t | t )
G (t | t )
≤
g (t | x )
G (t | x )
−
g (t | t )
G (t | t )
≥ −
g (t | x )
G (t | x )
−
ˆ x
y
g (t | t )
G (t | t )
d t ≥ −
ˆ x
y
g (t | x )
G (t | x )
d t
= −
ˆ x
y
d
d t
lnG (t | x ) d t
= −
$
lnG (x | x )− lnG
$
y | x
%%
= ln
G
$
y | x
%
G (x | x )
Now, applying the exponential function in the inequation, we obtain that for all
y < x ,
exp
>
−
ˆ x
y
g (t | t )
G (t | t )
d t
?
≥ exp
*
ln
G
$
y | x
%
G (x | x )
+
=
G
$
y | x
%
G (x | x )
L
$
y | x
%
≥ K
$
y | x
%
Summarizing Proposition 9.1 and 9.2 we can conclude that
E
/
REng
0
≥ E
/
RI I
0
≥ E
/
RI
0
9.2 TheWinner’s Curse
Let us suppose that it is being auctioned an object using a Sealed-bid First Price
Auction and, also, the only information available to a bidder 1 is his own signal
X1 = x ; and by now his estimate of the value is E [V |X1 = x ]. Now, consider that
the bidder 1 is announced as the winner of the auction. If all bidders are symmetric
following the same strategy β , then Y1:N−1 < x , then his estimate of the value would
be E [V |X1 = x ,Y1:N−1 < x ] < E [V |X1 = x ]. The announcement of winning the
auction means that the estimated value is going to decrease. Then, the possibility
that the winner pays more than the value is called the winner’s curse.
Suppose that there are N bidders where Xi = V + ϵi is each bidder’s signal with
ϵi are independently and identically distributed satisfying E [ϵi ] = 0. Then for all i ,
E [Xi |V = v ] = E [V + ϵi |V = v ] = v , which means Xi is an unbiased estimator but
the largest of such signals is not, E [maxXi |V = v ]>maxE [Xi |V = v ] = v , then the
expectation of the highest signal is greater than the value.
Thus, if a bidder does not take the winner’s curse into account would pay more
than the estimated worth of the object. What the bidder must do to avoid the
winner’s curse is shade their bids below their initial estimates.
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Now, let us verify that the equilibrium strategies in a First Price Auction could
have the winner’s curse.
β I (x ) =
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
%
d L
$
y | x
%
≤
ˆ x
0
v
$
y ,y
%
d K
$
y | x
%
<
ˆ x
0
v
$
x ,y
%
d K
$
y | x
%
= E [V1 |X1 = x ,Y1:N−1 < x ]
In the second inequality we use that v
$
·,y
%
is an increasing function. Thus,
we have seen that the equilibrium strategy in a First Price Auction is less than the
expected value conditional on winning.
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